According to Bertil Lintner, Myanmar’s ruling military junta decided to open up to the West in 2011 in order to reduce its dependence on China, but the Rohingya crisis has pushed Myanmar back toward China. “Even while the Belt and Road has a predominantly geo-economic motive, it is also being used for this military-strategic end.”. That’s partly a response to a greatly increased Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean: What began as three-ship anti-piracy patrols in 2008 became 10 years later swarms of submarines and amphibious ships, and soon, perhaps, patrols by China’s only operational aircraft carrier. , Chinese hold the 51 percent stake. Eight ethnic groups signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015. Unlike the Japanese projects where Myanmar retains controlling stakes, in. India’s Navy in those islands is in position to interdict shipping in the vital Strait of Malacca, whose vulnerability remains a headache for Chinese leadership. Gurpreet Khurana, former executive director of the country’s National Maritime Foundation, in an email. The infrastructure development plan calls for building road and rail transportation from Yunnan Province in China through Muse and Mandalay to Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State. “China viewed Burmese reengagement with the West through a zero-sum prism: It felt better relations with the West were coming at its expense,” said Derek Mitchell, a former U.S. special envoy and ambassador to Myanmar during its opening to the West. State-owned port operators are the aggressive leading edge of Beijing’s massive Belt and Road project. Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific. The ports are meant as commercial trading posts to enhance China’s world-leading shipping industry and bolster the country’s exports. “They are undeniably preparing for future naval operations in the area to secure their strategic and energy interests,” Khurana said. Closing that logistics gap—something the U.S. Navy did at sea during World War II, and with overseas bases in the decades that followed—became a priority for the Chinese navy after its first long-distance naval deployments to fight piracy off Somalia more than a decade ago. China has developed a deep-water port on Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal. Weeks prior to the Panglong Peace Conference in May 2017, UWSP led the formation of a new seven-member Federal Political Negotiation and Coordination Committee (FPNCC). Chinese port deals in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, the Maldives, and the Seychelles have all made headlines and chilled Indian planners who fear being choked by a Chinese “string of pearls.”. “My sense is that the deals announced were a collection of things already underway and was as much a demonstration of Burma’s desire to resist overwhelming Chinese influence,” Mitchell said. Asia, Southeast The two sides initiated a disengagement along the banks of Pangong Lake in Eastern Ladakh. An official projection of over 6 percent growth in the coming year is below economist estimates as the rest of the world still reels from the COVID-19 pandemic. The military coup in Myanmar is unlikely to be overturned and China seem's poised to gain the most from the fall of democracy. Beginning during the Obama administration, and continuing under U.S. President Donald Trump, India has also shed decades of reluctance to align too closely with the United States and has inked defense deals with Washington that help bolster its naval capacities. The announcement came two days after at least 38 protesters were shot dead by security forces. “All of this is of serious concern to India, seen in conjunction with China’s naval cooperation with Pakistan, including Gwadar, on the western seaboard.”. Her official visits to China have been viewed as. “Since the alienation of the West over the Rohingya issue, China has seen a new opening and a new opportunity in this, and they are more able to have their say in Naypyidaw and push their line there,” said Mitchell, now the president of the National Democratic Institute, a nonprofit that supports democracy around the world. Asia, Pacific The prospect that China would use commercial ports to expand the overseas reach of its navy has been around for years and has yet to fully materialize; while China has openly turned Djibouti into a military facility, other Chinese-owned ports, such as those in Sri Lanka and Cambodia, have only sporadically hosted Chinese naval vessels so far. Xi’s visit seems to have turned that around, highlighting how Beijing has been able to take advantage of Myanmar’s recent falling out with the West over allegations of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya minority and general backsliding on human rights by once-lionized leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi. Her official visits to China have been viewed as largely fruitful, resulting in a greater understanding between the two countries, and helping shield Myanmar from international ostracism. “The United States should pay particular attention to supporting India’s efforts to pose military dilemmas for China,” thus complicating the Chinese military’s ability to concentrate against U.S. assets in the Western Pacific, concluded the Center for a New American Security in a congressionally mandated study on the China threat released this week. of military hardware to Myanmar, accounting for 61 percent of weapons imported by Myanmar between 2014 and 2018, China has managed to carve a space in the domestic politics of Myanmar. Suu Kyi has been heavily criticized for her silence, but China has shielded her regime and the military in the UN, a Security Council statement drafted by the UK. The fear of falling into a Chinese “debt trap” has been palpable in Myanmar, too. That makes it harder to sustain India’s desire to become the go-to security provider in the Indian Ocean, and it makes greater cooperation with regional neighbors and countries like the United States more important. Chinese legal directives ordering state-owned shipping companies to offer logistics support to the Chinese navy—as they have done in recent years—turn China’s huge shipping fleet and port operations into a potential adjunct of its growing navy. between China and Myanmar has become visibly significant again, showing the extent of China’s grip over the politics and economics of Myanmar. China is keeping its vaccination campaign homegrown -- despite some reservations from the public. In addition to the development of the port at Kyauphyu, three weeks before the … Click here to subscribe for full access. Coup a further complication for tricky Myanmar-China ties. Dams may seem to be a perfect solution to Pakistan’s water woes, but they carry steep costs – literally and figuratively. Peace continues to be elusive, as the AA has shifted its focus to Rakhine State, where, with the Tatmadaw have reportedly increased in recent weeks. China will develop a multi-billion-dollar deep sea port in Myanmar's Kyaukpyu town along the Bay of Bengal, a development that will concern India which already has … Beijing is using commercial bridgeheads to give its warships staying power in the Indian Ocean. So what is India to do? From Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, the coast of Africa, the Mediterranean, the North Sea, and even in Latin America, China in recent years has acquired outright ownership, development rights, or a management concession to a bevy of strategically located ports. However, the more powerful ethnic groups abstained, including those along Myanmar’s northern border with China. After much speculation that Myanmar, in its intention to move toward political transition was showing signs of moving toward western countries. The move is an important step in reviving intra-regional tourism and recovery from the coronavirus recession. “The coup put China in a difficult position,” says Yun Sun, who researches China-Myanmar relations. Besides being the biggest supplier of military hardware to Myanmar, accounting for 61 percent of weapons imported by Myanmar between 2014 and 2018, China has managed to carve a space in the domestic politics of Myanmar. While the strength of these ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and their opposition to the NCA was likely to put the entire peace process in peril, to bring some of the EAOs to the negotiating table in the previous year. Moreover, China has positioned itself as a mediator between Myanmar and Bangladesh, which agreed to the three-step solution to the Rakhine State problems as proposed by China: stop violence, start repatriation and promote development. The port is the centrepiece of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) project -- a key thread in China's global Belt and Road vision. China Leaps Into Breach Between Myanmar and ... A raft of new multibillion-dollar development deals announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Myanmar earlier this month show how Beijing is back in business in the country after being sidelined from one of its preferred geopolitical stomping grounds for several years as Naypyidaw turned toward the West. This makes Myanmar a major access route to the Indian Ocean and a way to undercut China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” A 15-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was arrived at between China and Myanmar on the CMEC. Even the deep-water port, which China long sought, only came after Myanmar talked down the price from more than $7 billion to a little over $1 billion, leaving it less vulnerable to any Chinese debt trap. Power, Crossroads This makes Myanmar, to the Indian Ocean and a way to undercut China’s “Malacca Dilemma.” A. “It’s not large-scale checkbook diplomacy, and it’s not that significant compared to China, but it’s not insignificant,” he said. When Myanmar managed to renegotiate and downsize a multibillion-dollar Chinese-funded port project, it got a behind-the-scenes assist from a squad of American experts. That prompted concern in Beijing, which long supported the army in Myanmar and played an outsized role in the country’s economy, making it a virtual geopolitical appendage in Southeast Asia. Its investment in the Gwadar Port in Pakistan, for example, has long worried India. The largest construction project along the route is the 431 km Muse-Mandalay Railway, a project estimated to cost $9 billion. Additionally, China organized a meeting between the other three EAOs of the Northern Alliance and the Myanmar government in Kunming. , Myanmar’s ruling military junta decided to open up to the West in 2011 in order to reduce its dependence on China, but the Rohingya crisis has pushed Myanmar back toward China. But they have increasingly come to play a potentially more menacing role as dual-use ports that can give the beefed-up Chinese navy a global reach it lacked entirely just a few years ago. The biggest challenge to the effort will continue to be UWSP’s leadership of the bloc demanding a renegotiation of the terms. India is also stepping up cooperation with its fellow members of the so-called Quad, including the United States, Japan, and Australia, that are increasingly working together to knit the Indian Ocean into existing defense plans for the Pacific. for Us. “The Navy has budget constraints, so their share of the budget hasn’t gone up to match what they would like to achieve,” said Dhruva Jaishankar, an India expert at the Observer Research Foundation. China Leaps Into Breach Between Myanmar and West What happens next? It has been trying since at least 2012 to modernize and expand its navy to deal with the growing threat from China, but money is tight, and platforms have yet to materialize. Beijing’s influence in Myanmar permeates multiple levels of engagement between the two neighbors. Long history, shared borders, and lopsided demographics have made Myanmar leery of too close an embrace from China. This concern is highlighted when one compares the Kyauk Phyu port and SEZ projects — which was awarded to China’s CITIC group — with the Thilawa and Dawei SEZs, being developed by Japanese investments. trading partner and source of foreign investment, with Chinese enterprises investing in a substantial number of projects in Myanmar. Naval and other security cooperation with countries such as Indonesia, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Singapore “are steps to compensate for India’s inability to do it alone,” he said. political, business, social and military ties with the powerful United Wa State Party (UWSP). Amid increasing clashes between the two sides, China also facilitated negotiations between KIO and the Tatmadaw in Dali. That’s a route that Japan has taken, with some success, to counter China’s Belt and Road programs throughout Asia. China Leaps Into Breach Between Myanmar and ... Oh God, Not Another Long Telegram About China, China Is Losing Influence—and That Makes It Dangerous, The Middle East’s Next Conflicts Won’t Be Between Arab States and Iran. “As I see things, the Chinese are trying this at all possible places and countries,” said Indian Navy Capt. China’s proposal to build the CMEC was announced during a November 2017 meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Suu Kyi. The United States, too, has taken baby steps toward beefing up its ability to play checkbook diplomacy and compete with Chinese financing for much-needed infrastructure projects that Beijing uses to buy influence. © 2021 Diplomat Media Inc. All Rights Reserved. Unlike the Japanese projects where Myanmar retains controlling stakes, in Chinese investments, Chinese hold the 51 percent stake. “They use it as an opportunity to invest, whether through the Belt and Road or the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, or the peace process—those are all different ways to ensure that Burma remains in its sphere of influence.”. Report, Trans-Pacific Just $5 a month. of the peace process and find an alternative to the NCA. China has invested billions of dollars in Myanmar mines, oil and gas pipelines and other infrastructure and is its biggest trading partner. China is indispensable to all political entities in Myanmar, including the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military). Asia, South But with the Myanmar government recently delaying and cancelling BRI projects and developing some big ticket projects with India, like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral highway, the Kaladan Multi-modal transit transport network and the planned Special Economic Zone at the Sittwe deep-water port, China saw its own Myanmar designs taking a back stage. However, it is also true that the CMEC needs financing and China remains the most viable state with the ability to do so. Its members include the Northern Alliance Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army (MDAA), Ta-ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Arakan Army (AA) and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). But Indian and U.S. naval officers are increasingly concerned that China’s port-buying spree is laying the groundwork to enable its already huge and growing navy to dominate waters far from the Chinese coast. Following this, the Tatmadaw declared a four-month unilateral ceasefire in north and east, in order to improve conditions for negotiations. Indian officials say China is assisting rebel groups that have stepped up attacks on its border with Myanmar in recent months, opening another … Some have even called for attacks on the natural gas pipeline linking China’s Yunnan province to Myanmar’s port of Kyaukphyu, a flagship infrastructure project. A lot has to do with how China has meshed commercial and strategic interests in the development of the maritime portion of the Belt and Road. The transportation route follows gas and oil pipelines built in 2013 and 2017. At the same time, the government continues to carry out negotiations with other non-signatory EAOS, including the KIO. Despite all the commentary about Myanmar’s political and economic opening, China has continued to be Myanmar’s most important trading partner and source of foreign investment, with Chinese enterprises investing in a substantial number of projects in Myanmar. China’s inroads into the political roadmap of Myanmar is visibly evident from its role in the nationwide reconciliation with the ethnic rebels in the country. Although Aung San Suu Kyi’s relationship with China has been complicated given her stature as a pro-democracy leader, in her more recent political career as State Counsellor she has a pragmatic route with regard to foreign policy. Finally, at the economic level, a lack of alternatives makes Naypyidaw reliant on Chinese investments, thereby ensuring favorable policies towards China over the longer term, notwithstanding regime changes. From Nepal to India, Thailand to Myanmar, people are taking to the streets – or social media – to demand change. “Most of all, the instability in the country is detrimental to what China wants to pursue.” It is here that China’s intentions and its political maneuverability between the Suu Kyi government and its closest partners among non-signatory EAOs will be tested. China’s inroads into the political roadmap of Myanmar is visibly evident from its role in the nationwide reconciliation with the ethnic rebels in the country. China’s ties with the ethnic armed groups is not a recent phenomenon. However, it is also true that the CMEC needs financing and China remains the most viable state with the ability to do so. One of the flagship projects of China-Myanmar cooperation is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the strength of these ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and their opposition to the NCA was likely to put the entire peace process in peril, China has used its influence to bring some of the EAOs to the negotiating table in the previous year. Suu Kyi agreed to develop the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative. Given the instability in its border region and the economic value of Myanmar’s location alongside the Indian Ocean, it is no surprise that China has invested politically in the peace process in Myanmar. Boris Johnson is looking to old U.K. colonies for trade deals, but his government can’t compete with China and won’t get far until it abandons its neocolonial attitudes. Amid the pandemic and global economic chaos, the ongoing Rohingya refugee crisis in Southeast Asia has quietly been swept under a rug. These three EAOs — TNLA, AA and MDAA — went on to issue a joint statement late last year, signalling their interest in joining the peace process.